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The notion of conscience was at the heart of justifications for the jurisdiction and actions of 
several courts in medieval and early-modern England, and remains important today. This 
book seeks to understand what "conscience" meant in reference to the early-modern 
Chancery, the period which saw the last ecclesiastical Chancellors and the emergence of a 
more "law-like" Chancery. Klinck identifies several related issues: how did conscience 
determine the jurisdiction of the Chancery; did "conscience" impose standards, and if so 
from where did these standards come; were these standards objective or subjective?  
 
The book is divided into nine chapters. Aside from the introduction and conclusion (both of 
which are excellent), the arrangement is chronological: chapters 2-4 cover the medieval 
period, early-sixteenth century and later sixteenth-century respectively. Chapters 5 and 6 
form a unit, considering the theological material for the early-seventeenth century and then 
the legal material; chapters 7 and 8 repeat this format for the later-seventeenth century. Due 
to the continuing use of older ideas, the later chapters cannot be read in isolation.  
 
As any legal historian will admit, English lawyers have not always been forthcoming in 
explaining the conceptual basis for their activities. Theoretical ideas were rarely clearly, 
coherently or comprehensively articulated. This challenge to Klinck's project is addressed by 
using non-legal material. As he rightly observes "what is unarticulated comes from 
somewhere" (181). Klinck proceeds from the contentious premise that lawyers would reflect 
wider social ideas about conscience, which a powerful recent article by Michael Macnair 
("Equity and Conscience" (2007) 27 OJLS 659) expressly rejected. Klinck relies on the work 
of theologians known as casuists: divines who sought to provide answers or guidance to 
particular questions of conscience.  
 
Supporting Macnair, parts of Klinck's book shows legal writers steadfastly repeating the 
ideas and words of their predecessors, seemingly oblivious to changes in the wider context 
(e.g. 219-221). However, in other places Klinck's premise seems justified, with strong 
parallels (if not clear links) identified between contemporary casuist ideas and lawyers (e.g. 
Lord Nottingham on 233). Crucial support for Klinck's approach is his consideration of the 
norms applied in Chancery: if Chancery applied substantive norms derived from conscience, 
conscience cannot merely refer to the superior fact-finding capabilities of the Chancery (as 
Macnair argued). Klinck assembles material for the entire period which shows references to 
"conscience" in identifying the norms to be applied in specific cases.  
 
Klinck's conclusions on the notion of "conscience" are clear. Conscience had a range of 
meanings. In many cases, as per Macnair's main conclusion, it was a reference to superior 
fact-finding abilities. However, Klinck shows that such an idea was not unique to lawyers in 
early-modern England. Even Macnair's technical meaning of conscience is reflected in (or a 
reflection of) wider ideas.  
 
The most significant contribution of this book is that in other cases "conscience" seems to 
generate standards which resolved disputes. These standards were objective until the mid-
seventeenth century. Higher order law was usually at the basis of conscience, although 
human law was recognised as generating obligations in conscience. Later, theologians 
began to take a more individualised approach to matters of conscience. Rules of higher 
order law became more difficult to identify, and conscience changed from a standard by 
which actions were assessed to one where individual intentions were evaluated. Issues of 
conscience became less "law-like". However, the idea of conscience in the Chancery 
retained its older objectivity, diverging from wider contemporary notions of conscience and 
developing a meaning which removed the power for assertions of "conscience" to shape 
substantive legal norms. Klinck associates this development with the emergence of 
Chancery "case law". His conclusion about the Chancery in the late-seventeenth century is 
the same as Macnair: conscience is defined by "what the courts of conscience do" (Macnair, 
op.cit., 680). 
 
This objectivity was not mere conservatism: the Chancery came under "more pervasive, 
radical, and political" attacks from the mid-seventeenth century (225). Older justifications for 
the jurisdiction of the court were inadequate. Although Klinck does not make this link himself, 
as the concept of conscience became increasingly subjective, references to conscience itself 
may have aggravated the attacks. Klinck highlights that Lord Nottingham seems to have 
been aware of the criticisms and sought to address them (e.g. 226) by stressing the 
regularity of Chancery's proceedings and the basis of its actions in law. Doing so made the 
work of the Chancery ever more "law-like" and more remote from contemporary notions of 
conscience.  
 
Klinck's method is less successful when applied to the question of how conscience 
determined the jurisdiction of the Chancery. Theologians did not trouble themselves with the 
distinction between justiciable and non-justiciable matters of conscience. Klinck 
acknowledges this (146) and draws out some parallels, but these are weaker than the links 
identified for the issue of the substance of conscience.  
 
The discussion of non-legal material appears well-supported by the literature cited. The 
medieval ideas will be familiar to readers who have read work on Christopher St German, 
but the later material is not well-known to legal historians. The legal sources are limited to 
printed material. The real strength of the book is in bringing together the legal and non-legal 
material. Klinck does this well, although the absence of precise cross-references is 
frustrating. Chapters 5-8 are the strongest in the book, perhaps because they feature more 
sustained discussion of the non-legal material following the outpouring of casuist literature in 
the seventeenth century (107). The broad thesis Klinck advances is supported by the 
evidence he adduces and his methodology vindicated.  
 
The book's title refers to both "conscience" and "equity". Klinck focuses on the concept of 
"conscience", but generally uses "equity" only as a synonym for the Chancery and its 
jurisdiction. Given current legal history suggests a shift from the idea of "conscience" to 
"equity" at some point in the period (4), this is unfortunate. Klinck stresses the continued use 
of the language and idea of "conscience", but this is only half the issue: what about the 
concept of "equity" in relation to "conscience"? There are places where the quoted material 
would have supported such a discussion (e.g. the material on Christopher St German, 143 
and 179), but the question is left unconsidered. Exploration of this issue would have been a 
significant contribution to legal history.  
 
The book suffers from occasional anachronism, and although this never undermines the 
wider argument, it does affect individual points. For example, Klinck consistently uses the 
language of "convenience" to refer to pragmatic/policy concerns, interpreting an early-
modern use of the word in the same way (91). Norman Doe has demonstrated that the word 
had a quite different meaning in medieval law (Doe, Fundamental Authority in Late-Medieval 
English Law, 161-174), and may still have done so into early-modern law (a point which is 
half-heartedly acknowledged in a footnote on 119, but never applied). This raises some 
doubts about Klinck's discussion.  
 
These concerns do not detract from the broad conclusions, but they left this reader less 
convinced than is desirable. Nevertheless, the general methodology is convincing and the 
doubts do not seem to undermine the conclusions, which are supported by the evidence 
presented.  
 
 
